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Only a hermit would be unaware of the degree to which computers have perme-
ated every aspect of our lives. From the cradle to the grave our activities are influ-
enced, tracked, recorded and controlled by computers. Virtually every public and
private employee comes in contact with a computer in some capacity during the
work day. The possibilities of computer fraud are mindboggling, Those who deal
with these machines and develop the required expertise must be deterred from
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using their skills to the detriment of their employers and others.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the invention of the computer, the amount of property an
individual could steal or destroy was, to some extent, determined by
physical limitations.2 Criminals could take only as much property as
they could carry or arrange to transport.3 For example, the average
amount of money taken in a bank robbery has been estimated to be
about ten thousand dollars.4 Crime has, however, changed with the
times.5 A criminal can use modern technology to transfer extremely
large sums of money that formerly would have been impossible to re-
move without detection. A 1984 study conducted by the American Bar
Association Task Force on Computer Crime (the ABA Task Force Re-
port) estimates computer crime losses to be approximately 100,000 to
500,000 dollars per instance. Although the disparity between the dollar
figure reported in the ABA Task Force Report and the estimate of the
average amount seized in a manual bank robbery might seem alarming
in its own right, these figures barely hint at the most alarming aspect of
the computer crime phenomenon: its potential for growth.
American businesses, universities, and research organizations cur-
rently use an estimated 56,000 large general purpose computers and
213,000 smaller business computers.8 The private business sector uses
an additional 570,000 mini-computers and 2.4 million desktop com-
puters.9 Moreover, in 1982 the Federal Government owned more than
1. Tennessee v. Edmondson, No. 87-176-111 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 1988), reprinted in part
in 7 COMPUTER L. REP. 375, 376 (1988).
2. See Nawrocki, Special Report: There are too Many Loopholes; Current Computer Crime





7. See A.B.A., CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, TASK FORCE ON COMPUTER CRIME, REPORT ON COM-
PUTER CRIME (1984). The ABA Task Force surveyed over 1000 corporations, banks, professional
service firms, and state and federal agencies concerning their experiences with and awareness of
computer crime. Two hundred and thirty-eight firms and agencies responded. Id. at 16. More than
one-quarter of the respondents stated that they had experienced known and verified losses from
computer crime during the prior 12 months. Id. at 38. The responses indicated that annual loss
from computer crime was between $145 and $730 million, depending on whether the respondent's
estimated losses fell within the high or low end of the range of the amounts they had reported. Id.
These figures indicate that the average loss per respondent was between $2 and $10 million per
year. Id. The ABA Task Force concluded that management and the public may be underesti-
mating the size of the problem.





15,000 computers.' 0 Studies indicate that the trend to computerize will
continue at a rapid pace.11 The number of computers outside the realm
of business and government is growing rapidly as well. An estimated six
million home computers were in use in 1986.12 That figure is expected
to grow exponentially in the next few years. 13 In addition, home com-
puters are expected to be connected with the data banks of major insti-
tutions such as banks and retail stores.14 These figures illustrate the
burgeoning potential for computer abuse by members of the general
populace. The computer is no longer solely the tool of a few highly
trained technocrats. It has been delivered to a public that has embraced
its potential eagerly.15 Because computers may be used for destructive
as well as constructive purposes, their proliferation has forced Congress,
in considering the need for and effectiveness of federal computer crime
legislation, to search for legislative solutions that will prove suitable to
the society of computer users that it foresees in the immediate future.' 6
On October 12, 1984 legislators passed the first federal statute
prohibiting specific acts involving the use of a computer. 17 This legisla-
tion, the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act of 1984 (the 1984 Act), prohibited computer related activity in only
a few relatively narrow areas.' The decision to pass a statute that lim-
ited federal intervention to certain specific situations reflected legisla-
tors' realization that the scope of the computer crime problem was not
10. Id. In addition, "[tihe General Services Administration estimates that there will be
250,000 to 500,000 computers in use by the Federal Government by 1990." S. REP. No. 432, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2479, 2479.
11. See FINAL REPORT: SMALL BUSINESS COMPUTER SECURITY EDUCATION AND ADVISORY COUN-
CIL, published in 7 COMPUTER L. REP. 525 (1988). Thirty to thirty-five percent of the seventeen
million small businesses (under five hundred employees) in existence in 1985 used computers. Id.
at 530. That figure rose to more than 65% by 1987. Moreover, the report stated that "the com-
puter is used in a far more pervasive manner than just automating the word processing and ac-
counting operations." Id.
12. Nelson Statement, supra note 8, at H3278.
13. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 612, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986) (stating that an estimated
90 million home computers will be in use by 1999). "The exponential increase in the use of com-
puters also can be seen in the sale of software for personal computers. In 1976 these sales were
essentially zero but by the end of 1982 they were $1 billion." Id. at 5; S. REP. No. 432, supra note
10, at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2479 (stating that "[i]n 1978, there
were an estimated 5,000 desk-top computers in this country; today there are nearly 5 million").
14. Nelson Statement, supra note 8, at H3278.
15. See id. at 3277; see also Bloombecker, New Federal Law Bolsters Computer Security
Efforts, COMPUTERWOELD, Oct. 27, 1986, at 53 (discussing the "democratization" of computer
crime).
16. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 2-3, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 2479-81.
17. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
473, ch. 21, 98 Stat. 2190 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1988)) [hereinafter 1984
Act].
18. See id.; see also infra Part II(A).
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well known and that their actions might have unforeseen repercus-
sions.19 Legislators considered and rejected broader bills that criminal-
ized the use of a computer as a part of a scheme to defraud that
affected interstate commerce,20 choosing instead to protect only the
most vital federal interests that could be injured by computer users.21
The 1984 Act, however, was criticized for numerous substantive
and structural defects.2 2 Congressional sponsors of computer crime leg-
islation responded to this criticism by introducing several additional
bills for committee review.2" These bills and the ensuing committee
hearings addressed the criticisms of the 1984 Act.14 The Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act of 19865 (the 1986 Act) was the final product of
this refinement process.
The primary goal of this Note is to discuss the changes brought
about by the adoption of the 1986 Act and the policy reasons that form
the basis for those changes.2 6 A secondary goal is to explain why Con-
gress has exercised moderation in this area of legislation and to discuss
how existing legislation may be improved. Part II of this Note summa-
rizes the provisions of the 1984 Act, analyzes their function and struc-
ture, and discusses the criticisms offered by various commentators. Part
III summarizes the changes embodied in the 1986 Act, discusses the
19. See Betts, Private-Sector Computer Crime Bill Faces Fire at Hearing, COMPUTERWORLD,
June 3, 1985, at 15 (noting that "[r]epresentatives of the American Civil Liberties Union and the
American Society of Newspaper Editors expressed concern that the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act of 1984 may inhibit government whistle-blowers from disclosing computer-stored information
about fraud and abuse in federal programs").
20. See, e.g., H.R. 3570, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
21. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 4, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
2482.
22. See Tompkins & Mar, The 1984 Federal Computer Crime Statute: A Partial Answer to
a Pervasive Problem, 6 COMPUTER L. J. 459, 471-81 (1986). Federal prosecutors, for instance, com-
plained that the 1984 Act was not an effective tool for prosecution. See Computer Fraud Legisla-
tion: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1985) (statement of Victoria Toensing, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, Department of Justice) [hereinafter Computer Fraud Hearing]. Federal prose-
cutors apparently used the statute on only a few isolated occasions and testified that prosecution
under other statutes would be preferable in many instances. See Tompkins & Ansell, Computer
Crime: Keeping Up With High Tech Criminals, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1987, at 31. "To our knowl-
edge, only one person has been indicted under the 1984 law. (United States v. Fadriquela, No. 85-
CR-40, U.S. Dist. Ct. (D. Colo. 1985); in May 1985 Mr. Fadriquela pleaded guilty to misdemeanor
charges under the Act and was fined $3000)." Id. at 32; see Computer Fraud Hearing, supra
(describing why an existing espionage statute would be preferable to prosecute an act that theoret-
ically could be prosecuted under the 1984 Act).
23. See Tompkins & Mar, supra note 22; see also The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of
1986: Hearing on S.2281 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
24. See supra note 23.
25. Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1988))
[hereinafter 1986 Act].
26. See infra Parts II & III.
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policy judgments they reflect, and attempts to surmise whether these
changes accomplished their respective goals with particular emphasis
on the need to increase the deterrent value of the Act. Part IV discusses
an alternative policy toward deterrence that Congress did not incorpo-
rate in the 1986 Act and that may have undercut the deterrent impact
of other changes. Finally, Part V argues that to enhance the deterrent
value of the Act, Congress should require victims of computer crime to
take precautions to protect themselves and to report violations in addi-
tion to its current strategy of facilitating prosecution and increasing
sanctions.
The extensive body of legislative history and industry articles that
have appeared over the last few years provide a relatively clear picture
of why Congress chose to amend the 1984 Act as it did.27 This Note
uses that body of material to examine the manner in which the 1984
Act was intended to function, the criticisms of its actual function, and
the congressional rationale for its passage. An examination of the evolu-
tion of the law provides the contrast needed to grasp the significance of
the changes and helps elucidate the policy considerations that surround
the area of computer crime legislation.
II. THE COUNTERFEIT ACCESS DEVICE AND COMPUTER FRAUD AND
ABUSE ACT OF 1984: THE FIRST ATTEMPT AT FEDERAL COMPUTER CRIME
LEGISLATION
A. Scope and Structure of the 1984 Act
1. Background of the 1984 Act
Representative William Nelson, when confronted with the dilemma
of trying to devise effective and acceptable federal computer crime leg-
islation, hypothesized that the growing popularity of computers among
the general populace would create conflicts analogous to those that leg-
islators have encountered when they have attempted to pass gun con-
trol legislation.2 8 He commented that computer crimes are not crimes
27. See 132 CONG. REC. S14,456 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1986) (statement of Sen. Paul Laxalt).
Senator Laxalt noted:
[The Senate had attempted] to establish the most complete legislative history possible to
provide information about the intended meaning of the legislative language.. . . Because of
the complexity of the subject matter, we wanted to be as certain as we could that the limits
and the intended scope of this bill be clear to prosecutors and computer users alike.
Id.
28. Nelson Statement, supra note 8, at H3277. Representative Nelson stated:
Computers may not commit crimes-any more than guns commit crimes. But we have to
be realistic-there are people who will commit crimes with guns if they are readily available,
and there are people who will commit crimes with computers as they become ubiquitous in
1990]
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committed by computers, but are crimes committed by people assisted
by computers.2" The Congressman thus concluded that banning com-
puters would be as impractical as banning ownership of guns. ° He ob-
served that both items are potentially dangerous, but both are
considered essential forms of private property by many members of our
society. Consequently, the question for legislators studying the need for
a federal computer crime statute became how much control was
appropriate. 31
Congress originally seemed to believe that specific computer crime
legislation was not necessary.2 This initial restraint can be attributed
to two concerns: redundancy 33 and fear of federal overreaching.3 4 Wit-
nesses at committee hearings on the need for a federal computer crime
statute testified that forty to fifty existing federal statutes could be
used to prosecute computer assisted crimes.3 5 As a result, committee
members questioned the need for an additional federal statute.36 Legis-
our society. I doubt, frankly, that we can address the problem of crime by banning either.
Americans may not now be as attached to their computers as they are to their guns, but I




31. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 2482.
32. See Tompkins & Mar, supra note 22. Despite the introduction of more than a dozen
computer crime bills since 1979, Congress adopted no specific computer crime legislation until
1984. Id. at 460 n.2; see also Hollinger & Lanza-Kaduce, The Process of Criminalization: The
Case of Computer Crime Laws, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 101, 110 (1988) (stating that "[d]espite the im-
pressive array of testimony supporting a federal statute, no House or Senate committee could be
convinced that the federal government should play a specific role in controlling computer crime").
33. Computer Crime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 6 (1983) (statement of Rep. George
Gekas) [hereinafter Computer Crime Hearing]; see also Computer Security in the Federal Gov-
ernment and the Private Sector: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government
Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41 (1983)
(statement of Sen. William Cohen) [hereinafter Computer Security Hearings]; id. at 72-73 (state-
ment of Richard P. Kusserow, Inspector General, Department of Health & Human Services); id. at
138-39 (statement of John C. Keeney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, De-
partment of Justice); Hollinger & Lanza-Kaduce, supra note 32, at 110.
34. See Computer Crime Hearing, supra note 33, at 29, 30 (statement of Rep. Robert Kas-
tenmeier); see also Unauthorized Access to Individual Medical Records: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 6-7, 10 (1984) (statement of John C. Keeney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, Department of Justice); id. at 16-17 (statement of Rep. Ron Wyden).
35. See Computer Security Hearings, supra note 33, at 9 (statement of Susan H. Nycum,
Partner, Gaston, Snow & Ely Bartlett, Palo Alto, Ca.); id. at 40 (statement of August Bequai,
Counsel to the American Society for Industrial Security); see also Thackeray, Computer-Related
Crimes, An Outline, 25 JURiMETRIcS J. 300 (1985) (outlining many of the federal statutes applica-
ble to computer crime in 1984).
36. See supra notes 33-35.
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lators also were concerned that a federal computer crime statute might
have an adverse effect on state prosecution of computer crimes.3 7 Ap-
proximately twenty-one states had enacted computer crime legislation
by 1983. 88 This proliferation of state computer crime statutes and the
imminent prospect of enactment of computer crime legislation in the
remaining states caused members of the House Judiciary Committee to
question the propriety of federal legislation covering the same issues. 9
An additional concern was the breadth of any statute recommended by
the committee. A broad preemptive statute would ensure uniformity
among states. A narrower statute, alternatively, would limit federal ju-
risdiction to specific situations. 0
The lack of accurate information also hindered the committee pro-
cess.41 The only information available was anecdotal42 or based on in-
conclusive43 or unscientific44 polls. In addition, at least one witness
questioned, in the absence of any hard data, the existence of any signifi-
cant computer crime problem as of the time of his 1983 testimony 5 and
doubted the propriety of federal legislation in the absence of a clearer
37. See Computer Crime Hearing, supra note 33, at 27-31 (reporting discussion between
John C. Keeney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice
and various committee members).
38. See id. at 2 (statement of Rep. William Nelson).
39. See id. at 5 (statement of Rep. George Gekas); id. at 29 (statement of Rep. Robert
Kastenmeier).
40. Id. at 29 (statement of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier).
41. See Federal Computer Systems Protection Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1982)
(statement of Roger M. Olsen, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department
of Justice) [hereinafter Federal Computer Systems Protection Hearing] (citing a 1982 report,
"Electronic Fund Transfer Systems and Crime," by the Justice Department's Bureau of Justice
Statistics, which found that "no valid data for measuring and understanding the nature and extent
of EFT crime" existed); see also Hollinger & Lanza-Kaduce, supra note 32, at 105-06 (detailing
criticism of self-proclaimed experts' estimates of the magnitude of the computer crime problem).
42. See Hollinger & Lanza-Kaduce, supra note 32, at 105; supra note 41; see also Federal
Computer Systems Protection Hearing, supra note 41, at 38-39 (statement of Milton R. Wessel,
General Counsel to the Association of Data Processing Service Organizations). Mr. Wessel has
served as an Adjunct Professor of Computer Law at various schools including Stanford University,
Georgetown University, and Columbia University.
43. See Computer Security Hearings, supra note 33, at 212. The Department of Health and
Human Services published a 1983 report, "Computer-Related Fraud and Abuse in Government
Agencies," which concluded that "[a]lthough originally charged to discover the scope of computer-
related fraud and abuse in Government programs, the task force rapidly became aware that this
was not possible."
44. See Computer Security Hearings, supra note 33, at 170-72. The hearing report includes
the 30 question survey and accompanying cover letter that the American Society for Industrial
Security sent to its members as part of its effort to prepare evidence to present to the Senate
Subcommittee on Governmental Affairs. The survey generated 637 responses for a 29% return
rate. Id. at 163.
45. See Federal Computer Systems Protection Hearings, supra note 41, at 17, 39 (statement
of Milton R. Wessel).
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understanding of the nature of the problem.46 That testimony echoed
the concern of some congressmen present at the committee hearing.47
A sequence of events in 1983 and 1984, however, overshadowed the
concerns that had caused Congress to delay passage of a federal com-
puter crime statute.48 The American Bar Association and other public
and private associations first directed attention to the issue by publish-
ing several studies on computer crime.49 The impact of these reports
later was magnified by a groundswell of media attention toward com-
puter crime generated by a number of incidents involving juvenile com-
puter hackers.50 These news reports created an impression that
computer crime was a major problem for which an immediate solution
was needed. 1 Responding to these new stimuli, Congress soon passed
the 1984 Act.
2. Summary of the 1984 Act
The 1984 Act prohibited the unauthorized use of or access to a
computer in three comparatively narrow areas. First, the Act made it a
felony knowingly to access a computer without authorization, or in ex-
cess of authorization, in order to obtain classified United States defense
or foreign relations information with the intent or reason to believe that
such information would be used to harm the United States or to advan-
tage a foreign nation.52 Second, the 1984 Act made it a misdemeanor
knowingly to access a computer without authorization, or in excess of
authorization, in order to obtain information contained in a financial
record of a financial institution or in a consumer file of a consumer re-
porting agency.53 Third, the 1984 Act made it a misdemeanor knowingly
to access a computer without authorization, or in excess of authoriza-
tion, in order to use, modify, destroy, or disclose information in, or pre-
vent authorized use of, a computer operated for or on behalf of the
United States if such conduct would affect the government's use of the
46. Id. at 17.
47. See Computer Crime Hearings, supra note 33, at 7-8 (statement of Rep. Dan Glickman);
id. at 29 (statement of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier) (discussing the possibility of appointing a na-
tional commission to study computer issues).
48. See Tompkins & Mar, supra note 22, at 460; see also Hollinger & Lanza-Kaduce, supra
note 32, at 106-07.
49. See Tompkins & Mar, supra note 22, at 460 n.3; see also Hollinger & Lanza-Kaduce,
supra note 32, at 108 (noting that "[t]he ABA released a survey purporting to show significant
business and government victimization from computer crime immediately prior to the vote in 1984
on the first federal law").
50. See Hollinger & Lanza-Kaduce, supra note 32, at 106-07.
51. Id. at 107.
52. 1984 Act, supra note 17, § 1030(a)(1) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) (1988)).
53. Id. § 1030(a)(2) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (1988)).
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computer." The 1984 Act also made it a crime to attempt or to conspire
to commit any of the three acts described above.55
The Act provided enhanced penalties for repeat offenders58 and
empowered the Secret Service, along with other agencies, to investigate
offenses. 57 The 1984 Act further specified that the Attorney General
and the Secretary of the Treasury were to enter into an agreement de-
fining the scope of the Secret Service's investigative authority. 8
3. Analysis of the Provisions of the 1984 Act
The 1984 Act made knowing and unauthorized access to or use of a
computer beyond the scope of legitimate access the threshold require-
ments for prosecution.5 9 The parameters of these requirements de-
pended on the meaning of the terms "without authorization," "beyond
authorization,"60 "access," "computer," and "use," because no prosecu-
tion was possible unless a person "accessed" or "used" a "computer"
without or beyond "authorization." The 1984 Act, however, defined
only one of these terms, "computer.""'- The adopted definition of "com-
puter" was intended to limit the type of activity prohibited under the
1984 Act by explicitly excluding automated typewriters, typesetters,
hand held calculators, and other similar devices.2 This exclusion
helped to ensure that the legislation did not prohibit conduct which
Congress did not intend to proscribe.6 Once the threshold require-
ments were met, the 1984 Act created criminal liability only for the un-
54. Id. § 1030(a)(3) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3) (1988)).
55. Id. § 1030(b)(2) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(b)(2) (1988)).
56. Id. § 1030(c) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c) (1988)).
57. Id. § 1030(c) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(d) (1988)).
58. Id.
59. Id. § 1030(a)(1) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)(1988)). Each of the subpara-
graphs of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) specified that the 1984 Act applied only to persons who "knowingly
acces[sed] a computer without authorization, or having accessed a computer with authorization,
us[ed] the opportunity such access provide[d] for purposes to which such authorization d[id] not
extend." See, e.g., id.
60. See, e.g., id. (limiting violations to accesses "for purposes to which . . . authorization
does not extend").
61. Id. § 1030(e) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1988)). A computer is defined as
an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device
performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or
communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but
such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held cal-
culator, or other similar device.
Id.
62. Id.
63. See Tompkins & Mar, supra note 22, at 463 n.17. In contrast, most of the states that had
computer crime statutes at the time of the enactment of the 1984 Act provided broad statutory
definitions of "computer" that did not exclude such items. Id. at 463. The statutes thus could be
construed to cover acts that the states probably had no intention of prohibiting.
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authorized activities described in the three subsections of section
1030(a).14
Subsection (a)(1) prohibited the use of a computer to obtain classi-
fied defense, foreign relations, and nuclear information. 5 Congress nar-
rowly circumscribed the types of information to be protected under this
subsection by reference to existing legislation.6 6 The House Judiciary
Committee modified the language in the proposed subsection so that
the list of protected information would conform to the definition of
classified information spelled out in the Classified Information Proce-
dures Act.67 In addition, the Committee added "bad faith" as a prereq-
uisite to prosecution so that the 1984 Act would not extend liability
beyond existing espionage laws. 8 These changes appear to have served
the dual congressional goals of limiting the scope of the proposed legis-
lation to reduce the chances of unintended effects and of providing use-
ful language for prosecuting offenders.
Subsection (a)(2) prohibited the use of a computer to access with-
out authorization information contained in a financial record of a finan-
cial institution or contained in a consumer file of a consumer reporting
agency.69 The subsection protected the types of information encom-
passed by the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 197870 and the Fair
Credit Reporting Act.7 1 Subsection (a)(2) used the terms "financial in-
stitution," "financial record," "consumer reporting agency," and "con-
sumer" as they were defined in those Acts. 2
64. See 1984 Act, supra note 17, § (a) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (1988)).
65. Id. § 1030(a)(1) (current version at § 1030(a)(1) (1988)).
66. See H.R. REP. No. 894, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1984).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 21. The House Judiciary Committee stated that the Committee adopted the lan-
guage "with intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained is to be used to the
injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation" because the Supreme Court
in Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941), interpreted espionage law to require a showing of
bad faith before sanctions could be applied. H.R. REP. No. 894, supra note 66, at 21 (citing 18
U.S.C. § 793 (1982)).
69. See 1984 Act, supra note 17, § 1030(a)(2) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)
(1988)).
70. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1988).
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1988).
72. The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 defines a "financial institution" as "any office
of a bank, savings bank, [credit] card issuer, . . . industrial loan company, trust company, savings
and loan, building and loan, or homestead association (including cooperative banks), credit union,
or consumer finance institution, located in [the United States and its territories]." 12 U.S.C. §
3401(1) (1988). A "financial record" is defined as "an original of, a copy of, or information known
to have been derived from, any record held by a financial institution pertaining to a customer's
relationship with the financial institution." Id. § 3401(2).
The Fair Credit Reporting Act defines a "consumer reporting agency."
[A]ny person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly
engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit infor-
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The subsection, by referring to the Right to Financial Privacy Act
of 1978, made it a misdemeanor to access without authorization a com-
puter maintained by a "financial institution" and thereby obtain infor-
mation relating to an individual or a partnership of five or fewer
individuals, if such information could be identified with, or be identi-
fied as having been derived from, the financial records of a particular
customer.73 The referenced provision did not apply to information that
could not be associated with a specific person.74 The reference to the
Fair Credit Reporting Act made it a misdemeanor to access without au-
thorization "consumer reporting agency" files relating to an individual's
creditworthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living.75 Although sub-
section (a)(2) defined the types of financial information protected by
reference to the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 and the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, its prohibitions applied to all persons rather than
adopting the more limited protection granted under those Acts.76
The House Judiciary Committee emphasized that subsection (a)(2)
was not intended to encompass information incidentally obtained or the
use of information that was obtained legitimately"7 and attempted to
ensure that the provision would not be construed to prohibit computer
access for legitimate business purposes.78 The report made clear that
the sole purpose of the subsection was to deter hackers and other
criminals from accessing computerized financial files without authoriza-
tion. 79 Thus, unlike subsection (a)(1), subsection (a)(2) did not require
that the information be obtained with intent to injure any person." Un-
mation or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to
third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of
preparing or furnishing consumer reports.
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (1988). A "consumer" is defined as an "individual." Id. § 1681a(c).
73. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401(4), 3402 (1988).
74. See id. § 3413(a).
75. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1988).
76. See H.R. REP. No. 894, supra note 66, at 21. The Financial Privacy Act of 1978 applies
only to federal employees. The House Judiciary Committee Report on the 1984 Act, however,
states that being associated with or employed by the government is not a prerequisite to prosecu-
tion. See id. Presumably, Congress intended the subsection to be read in the same way with regard
to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which applies only to consumer reporting agencies.
77. See id.
78. See id. The Judiciary report stated that "any access for a legitimate purpose that is
pursuant to an express or implied authorization would not be affected. The provision does not
extend to normal and customary business procedures and information usage and so these legiti-
mate practices will not be interrupted or otherwise affected." Id.
79. Id. at 21, 22; see also id. at 10, 11 (recounting testimony that influenced the Committee's
view on subsection (a)(2)); 130 CONG. REc. H6315 (daily ed. June 22, 1984) (statement of Rep.
William Hughes) (indicating that subsection (a)(2) was added because of congressional concern
about incidents such as the intrusion into one company's computer credit files in 1984).
80. Compare 1984 Act, supra note 17, § 1030(a)(1) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)
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authorized access alone was enough to trigger liability."1
Subsection (a)(3) made it a misdemeanor to use, modify, destroy,
or disclose information in, or to prevent authorized use of, a computer
operated for or on behalf of the United States if such conduct would
affect the government's use of the computer. s2 The final phrase limited
the scope of the subsection by requiring the government to prove that
the unauthorized access affected a government computer operation.8
Furthermore, if the government only used a computer on a part-time
basis, subsection (a)(3) would apply only if the prohibited conduct sub-
stantially affected the government's operation of that computer.84 The
House Judiciary report stated that if such conduct did not substantially
affect a government computer operation, the unauthorized conduct
would have to qualify as an act prohibited by subsection (a)(2) to be
prosecuted under the 1984 Act.8 5
Subsection (a) concluded by setting out a use exemption to subsec-
tions (a)(2) and (a)(3)."8 The use exception excluded from subsection
(a)(3) actions that otherwise would have been violations if they were
committed by a person authorized to access a government computer
and that person exceeded such authorization solely by using the com-
puter's capacity for innocuous activities like doing homework or playing
computer games.8 7 The Judiciary Committee felt that such conduct
should be deterred by more informal administrative proceedings. 8
The Judiciary Committee report did not explain the purpose of a
use exemption for subsection (a)(2).9 The legislation on which the
(1988) with id. § 1030(a)(2) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (1988)).
81. Id. § 1030(a)(2) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (1988)); see also H.R. REP. No.
894, supra note 66, at 22 (stating that "[s]ection 1030(a)(3) is intended to make it a Federal of-
fense to access-with knowledge that the access is unauthorized-this information"). Subsection
(a)(3), like subsection (a)(2), did not require that the information be obtained with intent to injure
any person.
82. 1984 Act, supra note 17, § 1030(a)(3) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3) (1988)).
83. See H.R. REP. No. 894, supra note 66, at 22. The report stated that the "subsection re-
quires that 'such conduct affects such operation'; this phrase is to cover computers which are used
only part-time for the U.S. Government. If such conduct does not substantially affect the U.S.
Government operation, the prosecutions, if any, would have to fall within (a)(3). ... Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 1984 Act, supra note 17, § 1030(a) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (1988)). The
Act stated:
It is not an offense under paragraph (2) or (3) of this subsection in the case of a person having
accessed a computer with authorization and using the opportunity such access provides for
purposes to which such access does not extend, if the using of such opportunity consists only
of the use of the computer.
Id.
87. See H.R. REP. No. 894, supra note 66, at 22.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 20-23.
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Committee reported did not contain a use exemption for the subsection
that became subsection (a)(2) of the 1984 Act.90 The use exemption in
the bill that the Committee considered applied only to subsection (a) (3)
of the 1984 Act and a proposed subsection (a)(4), which was deleted
before the legislation was enacted.9 1 Thus, it seems likely that the use
exemption was included accidentally in subsection (a)(2) when the bill
was modified hurriedly to get Senate approval in time to be appended
to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act.2
The use exemption has no logical application to subsection (a)(2).
The Judiciary Committee's analysis of subsection (a)(2) expressly em-
phasized that any unauthorized access which resulted in the computer
user obtaining protected information would result in criminal liability
under the 1984 Act.9 The subsection did not require bad faith and ex-
cluded from liability only customary business usage that might other-
wise have been technically construed as unauthorized access.94 The
application of a use exemption to subsection (a)(2) contradicted the
purpose of the subsection and did not seem to serve a purpose similar
to that of the use exemption in subsection (a)(3).
Subsection (b) criminalized attempts and conspiracies to commit
the offenses described in subsection (a) of the 1984 Act.95 Subsection
(b)(1) prohibited attempted violations of subsection (a).9 6 In addition,
subsection (b)(2) made it an offense to conspire to commit an offense
under subsection (a) of the Act.97 The conspiracy provision was pat-
terned after the criminal conspiracy provisions in other legislation.
Thus, the language of the subsection probably was meant to impose a
standard equivalent to the "overt act" requirement embodied in compa-
rable criminal provisions. 8
Subsection (c) set penalties for convictions under the 1984 Act.99
The subsection used a two-tier approach, imposing a lighter range of
penalties for first-time offenders and applying heavier penalties for re-
peat offenders. 00 First-time offenders under subsection (a)(1), which
prohibited unauthorized access to classified defense, foreign relations,
and nuclear information, could be fined up to ten thousand dollars or
90. See id. at 21-22, 26-27.
91. See id. at 22, 26-27.
92. See infra note 108.
93. See H.R. REP. No. 894, supra note 66, at 21-22.
94. Id.
95. 1984 Act, supra note 17, § 1030(b) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(b) (1988)).
96. Id. § 1030(b)(1) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(b)(1) (1988)).
97. Id. § 1030(b)(2) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(b)(2) (1988)).
98. See Tompkins & Mar, supra note 22, at 469.




twice the value obtained by the offense, or imprisoned for up to ten
years, or both.'0 1 Repeat offenders under subsection (a)(1) could be
fined up to one hundred thousand dollars or twice the value obtained
by the offense, or imprisoned for up to twenty years, or both.102
Similarly, first-time offenders under subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3),
which prohibited unauthorized access to financial or consumer report-
ing agency files and misuse of government computers, could be fined up
to five thousand dollars or twice the value obtained or loss created by
the offense, or imprisonment up to one year, or both. 03 Repeat offend-
ers could be fined up to ten thousand dollars or twice the value ob-
tained or loss created by the offense, or imprisonment up to ten years,
or both. 0 4
Finally, subsection (d) delineated the government's investigative
jurisdiction under the 1984 Act.10 5 In addition, an enacted but uncodi-
fled provision of the 1984 Act stipulated that the Attorney General was
to report prosecutions under the Act to Congress annually during the
first three years following the statute's enactment. 06
B. Criticism of the Original Legislation
Although leaders in the computer industry hailed the 1984 Act as
an important first step,07 legislators and industry members generally
agreed that it was incomplete. 08 Many legislators and industry analysts
felt that the Act needed to be expanded to protect private sector com-
puters used in interstate commerce. 0 9 Moreover, state and federal law
enforcement officials criticized the 1984 Act as structurally flawed and
101. Id. § 1030(c)(1)(A) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(1)(A) (1988)).
102. Id. § 1030(c)(1)(B) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(1)(B) (1988)).
103. Id. § 1030(c)(2)(A) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(A) (1988)).
104. Id. § 1030(c)(2)(B) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B) (1988)).
105. Id. § 1030(d) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(d) (1988)).
106. See 1984 Act, supra note 17, § 2103 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 note (1988)).
107. See Betts, Recent Computer Crime Legislation Viewed as First Step, COMPUTERWORLD,
Oct. 22, 1984, at 11.
108. See id. The 1984 Act was approved on October 11, 1984, as a part of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act was appended to the Continu-
ing Appropriations Resolution, House Joint Resolution 648, which was approved as public law 98-
473 on October 12, 1984. The bill embodying the 1984 Act, H. R. 5616, probably would have died
on Senator Paul Laxalt's desk. Representative William Hughes, the House sponsor of the bill,
however, insisted as a prerequisite to compromise on the budget resolution that the Senate adopt
the House-passed computer crime bill. This maneuver resulted in a compromise between House
sponsors and Senate opponents in which the sponsors agreed to cut the provisions of the bill that
protected computers used in interstate and foreign commerce. The compromise was for the benefit
of Senator Laxalt, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Crime, who wanted to study the issue
more carefully during the following year. Id.; see also Computer Fraud Hearing, supra note 22, at
1 (statement of Sen. Paul Laxalt).




The Justice Department had a number of criticisms of the 1984
Act.110 It characterized subsection (a)(1), which prohibited unautho-
rized persons from obtaining classified data, as "largely redundant and
unnecessary" because other statutes already proscribed the unautho-
rized possession or retention of the same information and provided for
the same or harsher penalties, regardless of whether a computer was
used.' The Department also stated that prosecutors rarely would use
subsection (a)(1) because it had a higher scienter requirement than
other applicable espionage laws." 2
The Justice Department also criticized the scope of subsection
(a)(2), which protected certain financial and credit records from unau-
thorized access. This subsection protected only a very narrow class of
financial and credit information because it depended on the terms of
the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 and the Fair Credit Report-
ing Act."13 By limiting the scope of protection to financial information
encompassed by the Right to Financial Privacy Act, subsection (a)(2)
prohibited only unauthorized access to a bank's computer to obtain in-
formation contained in the account of an individual or a partnership of
five or fewer persons." 4 As a result, the subsection gave no protection to
corporate accounts or to the bank's own records of its deposits in other
institutions or loans because such records were not protected by the
Right to Financial Privacy Act." 5 Similarly, by limiting the protection
of credit information under subsection (a)(2) to the scope of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, the subsection protected only individuals and
failed to protect corporate credit files."16
The Justice Department saw no justification for limiting protection
of computerized financial and credit information to such a narrow class
of data and, thus, recommended that the scope of the subsection be
extended to protect all financial and credit data, personal or other-
110. See Computer Fraud Hearing, supra note 22, at 25-38 (statement of Victoria Toensing,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice). The Justice De-
partment's criticisms and suggestions were derived from its preparation of an administration spon-
sored bill (S. 1678, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)). Id. at 24.
111. Id. at 30.
112. Id. at 25. Section 1030(a)(1) required that a defendant knew that the protected informa-
tion "[was] to be used" to harm the United States or to help a foreign natiui,. Other espionage
statutes require only that the prosecutor prove that the defendant had "a reason to believe that
the information could be used" to harm the United States or to the advantage of a foreign country.
Id.






wise.117 The Department added, however, that if the goal of subsection
(a)(2) was to protect against the use of computers to obtain the type of
personal information that was made confidential through the operation
of federal laws, then the subsection should be extended to protect other
types of personal data such as tax return and census information.118
The Justice Department also counseled modification of subsection
(a)(3), which made it an offense to use, modify, destroy, or disclose in-
formation in, or to prevent authorized use of a computer operated for or
on behalf of the United States if such conduct would affect the govern-
ment's use of the computer. The Department recommended that the
subsection should be a strict trespass provision.119 The subsection, as
formulated, proscribed unauthorized access only if the trespasser used,
modified, destroyed, or disclosed data contained in government com-
puters, or prevented authorized use of the computers.2 0 The Depart-
ment felt that unauthorized access to a government computer was
analogous to physical trespass onto government property and recom-
mended that prosecutors should not be required to show any additional
elements, such as destruction of information, to gain a conviction.2
The Justice Department also saw ambiguity in another jurisdic-
tional element of subsection (a)(3), which prohibited certain conduct
only if the computer involved was operated for or on behalf of the
United States government and "such conduct affect[ed] such opera-
tion.'1 22 The Department stated that from a grammatical standpoint
the provision required the government to prove that the person's con-
duct affected the operation of the computer.2 2 The Department was
concerned, however, that the provision might be interpreted instead to
require the prosecutor to prove that the prohibited conduct affected the
operation of the government.124
The Justice Department also recommended that legislators add two
new offenses and one new sanction to any future amendment of the
1984 Act. The Department suggested the additions of a computer fraud
offense, 2 5 a destruction of property offense, 126 and a criminal forfeiture
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 32.
120. See 1984 Act, supra note 17, § 1030(a)(3) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3)
(1988)).
121. See Computer Fraud Hearing, supra note 22, at 32.
122. 1984 Act, supra note 17, § 1030(a)(3) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3) (1988)).
123. See Computer Fraud Hearing, supra note 22, at 32; see also supra Part II(A)(2) (sug-
gesting that the House Report requires a similar interpretation of the provision).
124. See Computer Fraud Hearing, supra note 22, at 32.
125. Id. at 34.




The Justice Department sought its alternative computer fraud pro-
vision due to worries that the use of a computer to facilitate the com-
mission of a common-law offense like theft or embezzlement might
prevent the application of existing federal statutes to such acts.12 '8 To
combat that possibility, the Department recommended that legislators
enact a fraud offense modeled after the federal mail and wire fraud
statutes. 12  The Department further recommended that federal jurisdic-
tion should attach to such an offense if the computer involved was
owned or operated on behalf of the federal government or a federally
insured financial institution, or if the offense involved computers lo-
cated in two or more states or in a state and a foreign country."'
The Justice Department also wanted legislators to add a felony of-
fense prohibiting the willful and unauthorized destruction of a com-
puter owned by or operated for the government or a federally insured
financial institution, or a computer program or data contained in such a
computer. 31 The Department cited a clear federal interest in protecting
such a limited class of computers, software, and data and concluded
that such a provision would have a minimal impact on an area of juris'
diction traditionally reserved for the states.3 2
The Justice Department's final recommendation to legislators was
the addition of a new punishment provision by which a defendant could
be forced, upon conviction, to forfeit ownership interest in any com-
puter used to commit an unauthorized access offense, computer fraud
offense, or computer destruction offense. 3 3 The Department felt that a
127. Id.
128. See id. at 35 (describing instances in which federal prosecutors were able to adapt ex-
isting statutes to apply to computer facilitated crimes, but pointing out how such crimes would not
have fallen within the purview of federal law if the facts in each case had been slightly different).
129. Id. at 35. The commerce clause, federal regulation, and federal insurance of many types
of financial institutions would justify federal jurisdiction over such a fraud offense. Id. at 34.
The Justice Department emphasized that in fraud cases the computer was merely a vehicle,
comparable to the mails or interstate telephone wires. Thus, the Justice Department recommended
that the language of the proposed computer fraud provision track the language of existing mail
and wire fraud statutes so that the "extensive body of case law that ha[d] been developed with
respect to these statutes c[ould] be applied." Id. at 35-36.
130. Id. at 36. A two-state diversity jurisdictional provision "would reserve federal jurisdic-
tion for those cases where it [was] most needed and for those which the states [would be] the least
capable of investigating and prosecuting." Id. The Justice Department suggested that it would be
unrealistic to expect a state to investigate and prosecute a fraud scheme that made use of com-
puters located in several different states because a state's laws apply only within its borders. Id.
Moreover, a diversity jurisdiction provision would be much less of an intrusion into states' rights
than a provision that extended jurisdiction to a fraud scheme involving any computer operating in
or affecting interstate commerce. Id.





forfeiture provision would be a particularly effective deterrent for per-
sons who otherwise might use personal computers or small business
computers to gain unauthorized access to a government computer.""4
The Department stated that a forfeiture provision was justified further
by the fact that courts had not in the past tended to send such offend-
ers to jail or impose meaningful fines."3 5
Other commentators criticized the 1984 Act for failing to define its
key terms. 3 6 Some of the words whose meanings were critical to a clear
understanding of the Act had no commonly accepted legal definition. 3 7
Thus, Joseph B. Tompkins, Jr., the Chairperson of the ABA Criminal
Justice Section Task Force on Computer Crime, suggested that poten-
tially ambiguous terms like "access,"138 "authorization," "affects," and
"use" 13 9 be defined in any amendment of the 1984 Act. 40
Chairperson Tompkins also noted that the 1984 Act did not define
"access without authorization" or give any method for determining how
far "access with authorization" extended.' 4 ' The terms were not partic-
ularly problematic in the case of hackers, but became ambiguous when
applied to employees who otherwise were not trespassing on their em-
ployer's premises. 42 The legislative history of the 1984 Act made clear
that subsection (a)(2) was not intended to prohibit access for a legiti-
mate purpose pursuant to express or implied authorization. 43 Congress,
however, did not define "legitimate purpose." That lack of definition,
coupled with the fact that subsection (a)(2) prohibited only knowingly
unauthorized access, made the effectiveness of the provision dependent
on the clarity or lack thereof of an employer's definition for its employ-
ees of authority and breadth of access to information. 4
Chairperson Tompkins also recommended more substantive
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Tompkins & Mar, supra note 22, at 475.
137. See id. at 475-76.
138. An earlier bill, S. 240, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), defined "access" as "to approach,
instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve data from, or otherwise make use of any re-
sources of, a computer, computer system, or computer network." Similar definitions of "access"
have been used in many state computer crime statutes. See Tompkins & Mar, supra note 22, at
464.
139. A House Bill defined "use" as "to instruct, communicate with, store data in, or retrieve
data from, or otherwise utilize the logical, arithmetic, or memory function of a computer, or, with
fraudulent or malicious intent, to cause another to put false information into a computer." H.R.
1092, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). Many states have adopted this type of definition of "use" in
their computer crime statutes. See Tompkins & Mar, supra note 22, at 464.
140. Tompkins & Mar, supra note 22, at 476.
141. Id. at 464.
142. Id. at 464-65.
143. See H.R. REP. No. 894, supra note 66, at 21.
144. See Tompkins & Mar, supra note 22, at 465.
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changes to the 1984 Act. He suggested that in addition to the types of
substantive changes recommended by the Justice Department, new leg-
islation should include a provision providing civil remedies for victims
of computer crime and a section dealing with the problems of concur-
rent jurisdiction.14 5 He also suggested that the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation should be granted primary investigative jurisdiction because
the 1984 Act covered primarily government computers and classified
information. 148
Although legislators generally agreed that expansion of the 1984
Act was indicated,1 47 the extent of expansion needed remained unclear.
Legislators continued to frame the problem in terms of federal inter-
est. 48 Senator Paul Laxalt, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on
Criminal Law, viewed the problem as a question of how Congress in-
tended to treat acts that were neither matters of clear federal interest
nor matters clearly belonging under state and local control.149 The Sen-
ator felt that Congress was justified in making it a federal crime to gain
unauthorized access to or to damage or destroy computers and their
software or data owned or operated by the federal government or feder-
ally insured financial institutions.150 He also believed that the federal
government had a clear interest in punishing those who obtained infor-
mation from such computers without authorization.' 51 The Senator be-
lieved that states should regulate the crimes of trespass, malicious
mischief, and theft committed with privately owned computers if no
federal interest in the computers or the information that they contained
existed.'15  The Senator felt, however, that a number of possible crimi-
nal acts fell between these two poles and warranted further
discussion.153
One of Senator Laxalt's primary concerns was whether state and
145. Id. at 477-78. Chairperson Tompkins believed that the potential negative consequences
of abuse of civil remedies were outweighed by the severe economic impact of computer crime and
the lack of other available remedies and scarcity of law enforcement resources. Id. at 477.
146. Id. at 480.
147. See Computer Fraud Hearing, supra note 22, at 1 (statement of Sen. Paul Laxalt).





153. Id. The Senator outlined three areas of concern: (1) crimes committed with computers
owned by the federal government and by federally insured financial institutions; (2) crimes involv-
ing exclusively private computers that contain information with a significant federal interest, such
as information protected by the Fair Credit Reporting Act; and (3) crimes involving private com-
puters that cannot be investigated and prosecuted practically by state and local authorities even
though no clear federal interest in either the computers or the data is present. Id.
The Justice Department criticism discussed in Part II(B) of this Note addresses the first two
of these concerns. See supra notes 110-35 and accompanying text.
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local prosecutors would be able to investigate and prosecute computer
crimes that the federal government might decline to pursue.15 William
G. Petty, a representative of the National District Attorney's Associa-
tion, agreed with that concern.155 Mr. Petty felt that jurisdictional
problems necessitated a preemptive federal statute because the rules of
venue posed a potentially debilitating problem for state and local prose-
cutors.15 6 He explained that unauthorized computer access often
originates from remote computers through the use of telephone lines
rather than through direct physical access of the target computer. 51 He
also noted that a computer system subject to such access might be
physically located in several different jurisdictions and that it was often
difficult, if not impossible, to determine where the unauthorized access
occurred." 8 He pointed out that because a prosecutor must prove that
an alleged offense occurred in the jurisdiction of prosecution, many
computer crimes could present a situation in which a state's attorney
would be unable to prosecute in any jurisdiction in the state.159
Mr. Petty felt that a preemptive federal computer crime statute
was preferable for a number of other reasons. He felt that the federal
government's superior investigative resources were needed to combat
computer related crime effectively.16 0 He noted that computer related
crimes often were difficult to detect and prosecute and that local law
enforcement agencies often did not have the training and experience to
conduct such investigations.'' He believed that local law enforcement
agencies could not commit the resources necessary to deal effectively
with these types of crimes and still fulfill their obligations to respond to
ordinary offenses, particularly in light of the fact that such investiga-
tions might involve a number of law enforcement agencies in a number
of states. 6 2 Consequently, he favored preemptive federal legislation
that would allow a single agency to conduct and coordinate such inves-
tigations and would make available sufficient resources to ensure suc-
cessful prosecution. 63
Mr. Petty added that a preemptive federal statute also would pro-
154. Computer Fraud Hearing, supra note 22, at 2 (statement of Sen. Paul Laxalt).
155. Id. at 39-50 (statement of William G. Petty on behalf of the National District Attorney's
Association). Mr. Petty also served as Commonwealth Attorney for Lynchburg, Virginia at the
time he testified.










vide a uniform definition of criminality,164 which would be needed be-
cause no uniform definition of criminal conduct in the use of computers
existed'65 Furthermore, he felt that this lack of uniformity was a dis-
tinct problem in an era in which businesses and financial institutions no
longer were constrained by state boundaries because such entities need
certainty that computer crimes will be penalized regardless of the state
in which they occurred.168
Mr. Petty also admonished the legislators to be certain that any
amendments to the 1984 Act were sufficiently flexible to accommodate
the changing nature of computer crime and, like the Justice Depart-
ment, recommended the adoption of fraud language patterned after ex-
isting federal mail and wire fraud statutes 6 7 because such legislation
would be flexible enough to withstand advances in technology. He
warned against a "patchwork" approach of addressing specific incidents
only after they had been exposed by an outrageous, yet legal, act be-
cause such an approach caused rigidity that could lead only to ineffec-
tive and obsolete legislation.6 8
Thus, Congress received a clear message that the 1984 Act needed
to be expanded and clarified in a number of ways. In addition, commen-
tators had presented numerous options for achieving these results. Ju-
risdiction could be broadened by expanding the types of computers
protected by the Act, by expanding the types of information protected
by the Act, or by making the use of computers for specified purposes
unlawful, regardless of whether such use was authorized. Clarity could
be improved by modifications of language and structure and by adding
new definitions. Congress attempted to address these issues in the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.169
164. Id. at 43.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 43-44. Although Mr. Petty favored a preemptive federal statute, he believed that
no statute would be an effective deterrent without victim cooperation. He felt that a pervasive
federal statute was needed to gain the full cooperation of victims of computer crime and that such
confidence would not be present unless prosecutors were able to investigate computer crimes suc-
cessfully and gain the convictions of offenders, regardless of their location. Id. at 44.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 1986 Act, supra note 25 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1988)).
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III. THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT OF 1986: A MEASURED
RESPONSE TO CRITICISM OF THE 1984 ACT
A. Summary of the Changes under the 1986 Act
The amendments embodied in the 1986 Act improved the 1984 Act
in a number of respects. The amendments eliminated some ambiguous
language, structured the offenses more coherently, defined additional
terms, and expanded the scope of the Act to encompass additional sig-
nificant types of computer crime.1 0
1. Modification of the Original Provisions
The 1986 Act made seven important changes to the 1984 Act. First,
the 1986 Act clarified subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) by eliminating the
convoluted "or having accessed a computer with authorization . . ."
language in favor of the more succinct phrase "or exceeds authorized
access."'171 Second, the 1986 Act modified subsection (a)(3) into a strict
trespass provision by making unauthorized access alone a criminal of-
fense. 172 Third, the 1986 Act repealed the use exemption that had lim-
ited the application of subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3).17 Fourth, the 1986
Act removed a potential concern that subsection (a)(3) might discour-
age those seeking to expose government wrongdoing by deleting a pro-
viso in the subsection that prohibited "disclosure" of information.174
Fifth, the 1986 Act changed the intent requirement of subsections
(a)(2) and (a)(3) from "knowingly" to "intentionally.' '7 Sixth, the 1986
Act eliminated the special conspiracy provision created in the 1984
Act. 76 Finally, the specific fines set forth in the 1984 Act were repealed
and replaced with the instruction that fines levied under the Act were
to be imposed under "this title.' ' 77
2. Addition of New Provisions
The 1986 Act also expanded the reach of the 1984 Act by adding
three new crimes embodied in the new subsections (a)(4), (5), and (6).
Subsection (a)(4) created a federal computer fraud offense. 78 Subsec-
tion (a)(5) created an offense for the alteration, damage, or destruction
170. See Tompkins & Ansell, supra note 22, at 32.
171. 1986 Act, supra note 17, § 2(c), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1), (2) (1988).
172. Id. § 2(b)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3).
173. Id., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3).
174. Id., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3).
175. Id. § 2(a)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), (3).
176. Id. § 2(e).
177. Id. § 2(f), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c).
178. Id. § 2(d), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4).
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of information contained in a "Federal interest computer" and prohib-
ited the prevention of authorized use of such data. 79 In addition, sub-
section (a)(6) made it a crime to traffic in computer passwords under
certain circumstances. 8 ' The 1986 Act also added a much needed defi-
nition section.18'
B. Analysis of the Amendments Provided in the 1986 Act
The amendments to the 1984 Act left subsection (a)(1) essentially
unchanged. The only change was to replace the complex and confusing
"or having accessed a computer with authorization 
... " language with
the simpler phrase "or exceeds authorized access."'182
The 1986 amendments changed the scienter requirement in subsec-
tion (a)(2) from "knowingly" to "intentionally" and deleted the subsec-
tion's reference to the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978.183 The
legislators changed the scienter requirement for two reasons. First, they
wanted to proscribe only intentional acts of unauthorized access and
not mistaken, inadvertent, or careless acts.18' Second, they felt that a
"knowing" standard was inappropriate in light of the unique circum-
stances in cases involving computer technology. 185
A House Report on the Criminal Code'8 6 stated that a person was
acting knowingly if the person was cognizant that a certain result was
almost certain to follow from particular conduct, whether or not that
result was intended. 87 The report expressed fear that a "knowing"
standard could impose liability on a person who inadvertently accessed
another person's computer file or data.' 88 The Senate felt that this con-
cern was particularly justified when an individual authorized to sign on
and use a particular computer subsequently exceeded authorized access
by mistakenly entering another computer file or data accessible from
the same terminal.'89 Legislators chose to substitute an "intentional"
standard to focus federal criminal prosecutions on those persons whose
179. Id., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5).
180. Id., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(6).
181. Id. § 2(g), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e).
182. Id. § 2(c), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1).
183. Id. § 2(a)(1), (2), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).
184. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 5.
185. Id.
186. HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL CODE REvISION ACT OF 1980, H.R. REP. No.
1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
187. Id. at 33 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978)).
188. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 6.
189. Id. The report explained that because a user had signed onto a terminal "knowingly,"
liability might be found for accidentally accessing another file because a trier of fact could infer
that the user was almost certain such mistaken access could result from the initial decision to
access the computer. Id.
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conduct indicated a clear intent to access another person's computer
files or data without proper authorization.'"0
The 1986 Act also modified subsection (a)(2) by deleting its refer-
ence to the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978.191 The Right to Fi-
nancial Privacy Act of 1978 had been used to define the terms
"financial institution" and "financial record."' 9 2 The amended Act de-
fined these terms internally in a new subsection (e). 93 The premise of
the original subsection (a)(2) was to protect, for privacy reasons, the
computerized credit records and computerized information relating to
customers' relationships with financial institutions. 194 Congress wanted
to extend the same privacy protection to the financial records of all cus-
tomers of financial institutions, including individuals, partnerships, or
corporations.'95 To accomplish this aim, Congress redefined the terms
"financial institution" and "financial record" in broader terms than
those provided by the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978.
The Justice Department had been concerned that the "obtains in-
formation" language in subsection (a)(2) might require the prosecution
to prove the physical removal of data as an element of the crime.19 The
Senate report clarified that subsection (a)(2)'s prohibition against ob-
taining information covered the "mere observation of the data" con-
tained in such files, emphasizing again that the premise of the
subsection was privacy protection.197
The 1986 Act replaced the original subsection (a)(3) with an en-
tirely new provision.19 8 This new provision prohibited acts of simple
trespass against computers belonging to, or being used by or for, the
federal government.'9 9 The new subsection (a)(3), however, limited the
trespass offense to cases in which the offender was not employed by the
federal government and had no authority to access a computer of any
agency or department of the United States, or to cases in which a fed-
190. Id.
191. 1986 Act, supra note 25, § 2(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (1988).
192. 1984 Act, supra note 17, § 1030(a)(2) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (1988)).
193. 1986 Act, supra note 25, § 2(g), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (1988). For the text of subsection
(e), see infra note 254.
194. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 6.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 6-7.
198. Compare 1984 Act, supra note 17, § 1030(a)(3) with 1986 Act, supra note 25, § 2(b)(1),
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3) (1988).
199. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 7. The Justice Department had been concerned
that the original subsection (a)(3) seemed to require that the prosecutor prove more than simple
access. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text. Apparently Congress had not meant to




eral employee's act of trespass was interdepartmental in nature. 00
Congress inserted these limitations to ensure that the subsection
was not broad enough to create a risk that federal employees and others
who were authorized to use a federal computer would be prosecuted for
acts of computer access and use that, while objectionable, did not rise
to the level of criminal conduct." 1 Congress balanced this concern
against the legitimate desire to protect government computers against
abuse from outsiders.20 2 Congress reconciled these competing concerns
by formulating the language of the subsection so that acts by govern-
ment employees who merely exceeded their authorized access to com-
puters in their own department would not be criminal. 03 The
legislators felt that employees who were authorized to use a particular
computer in one department, and who briefly exceeded their authorized
access by improperly examining intradepartmental data, should be sub-
ject to administrative proceedings rather than criminal sanctions.20 4
Congress wanted to avoid a situation in which an employee could face
criminal prosecution for even the slightest unauthorized use of a de-
partmental computer or departmental computer files.20 5 Congress also
saw the exclusion of this sort of activity from criminal sanctions as a
means to alleviate concerns that the Act could be used to prosecute
government whistleblowers. °6
In contrast, the subsection did criminalize acts by which govern-
mental employees gained unauthorized access to computers or data be-
longing to another department or agency.2 07 Legislators considered that
government employees who used their department or agency computers
without authorization to gain access to data belonging to another de-
partment or agency were analogous to outsiders who attempted to ac-
cess government computers.208  Both the outsider and the
extradepartmental government employee are without any authority to
access or use the government's computer. Thus, Congress felt justified
in providing criminal sanctions in such cases. Legislators acknowledged
that this dichotomy between intra and interdepartmental access could,
in rare cases, leave serious cases of intradepartmental trespass free from
200. S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 8.
201. Id. at 7.
202. Id.
203. Id. The term "department" was defined in § 2(g)(4) of the 1986 Act. 1986 Act, supra
note 25, § 2(g)(4), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(7) (1988).
204. S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 7.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 8, 21; see also Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5 (1985) (statement of Allen Adler, A.C.L.U.).




criminal prosecution under subsection (a)(3).s°9 They noted, however,
that such serious acts might be subject to other criminal penalties.21 0
The new section also was intended to clarify Congress's intent that
prosecutors need to show only that an offender's conduct affected the
government's use of one of its computers or a computer operated on
behalf of the government, not that the offender's conduct affected the
overall operation of the government. 1' In addition, the new provision
changed the scienter requirement of subsection (a)(3) from "know-
ingly" to "intentionally" for the same rationale as the change in subsec-
tion (a)(2).1 2
The new subsection (a) (4) created the first federal computer fraud
offense.2 13 Its legislative history emphasized an intent to penalize thefts
of property by computer that occurred as a part of a scheme to defraud
and emphasized that the new subsection required a showing that the
use of the computer or computers in question was integral to the in-
tended fraud.214
Congress chose not to pattern the computer fraud provision di-
rectly after existing mail and wire fraud statutes so that computer us-
age "wholly extraneous" to an intended fraud would not be punishable
under the provision, which made violations a felony.21 In addition,
Congress chose to word subsection (a)(4) in a way that distinguished
acts of theft using a computer from acts of computer trespass.21 It con-
sidered theft, as a general rule, more serious than trespass and wanted
to treat the offenses differently. 17 Legislators acknowledged that the
loss of computer time resulting from repeated or sustained trespasses
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 8-9.
212. Id. at 7.
213. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
214. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 9.
215. See id. Legislators worried that if the subsection were patterned directly after existing
mail and wire fraud statutes, the subsection might be used to punish an individual for "computer
fraud" merely because the individual, in devising and executing a scheme to defraud, used a com-
puter to keep records or calculate his potential take from the crime. Legislators felt that a fraud
scheme should not fall under the scope of subsection (a)(4) merely because the perpetrator signed
onto a computer at some time near the commission of the fraud. Id.
216. Id. Legislators noted that any act of trespass could be classified as a theft of property
for two reasons. First, by intentionally trespassing into someone's computer files, the offender
would obtain, at the least, information on how to break into that computer or system. Similarly,
every trespass necessarily involves a theft of computer time. Id. at 9-10.
217. Id. at 9-10; see also 1986 Act, supra note 25, § 2(d), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c) (1988). A first-
time trespass offense would be a misdemeanor under the 1986 Act, whereas the computer fraud
offense would be a felony. A trespass could, however, constitute a felony under subsection (a)(1)
because mere unauthorized access of a computer containing classified data would result in the




could reach a level sufficient to warrant federal prosecution, 21s but be-
lieved that such acts would be punished more appropriately under a
provision relating to the prevention of unauthorized use of a com-
puter.219 Consequently, they fashioned subsection (a)(4) to require the
prosecutor to prove that the defendant accessed the computer with an
intent to defraud, that the unauthorized access furthered the intent to
defraud, and that the perpetrator intended to or did obtain something
of value other than the use of computer time.22
The new felony created by subsection (a)(4) only encompassed
cases involving "Federal interest computer[s],"221 which were defined in
new subsection (e)(2). Congress patterned the scienter requirement for
the subsection, "knowingly and with intent to defraud," after the fed-
eral credit card fraud statute. 2
Subsection (a)(5) created an offense for the intentional,223 unautho-
rized alteration, damage, or destruction of information contained in a
federal interest computer and for the intentional, unauthorized obstruc-
tion of use of federal interest computers or of the data they contain.2 4
This subsection, like the new subsection (a)(3), was created primarily to
deter activity by outsiders. 25 Subsection (a)(5) created federal protec-
tion against such outsider activity in two circumstances: (1) when any
such activity caused loss to a victim or victims totalling one thousand
dollars or more during any single year period;226 and (2) when such ac-
tivity involved data related to medical treatment, regardless of the
amount of damage caused. 27
Legislators decided that the one thousand dollar threshold was
needed to prevent felony charges against every person who committed
such acts,228 noting that misdemeanor charges would remain available
in many instances in which the threshold amount could not be
proven.229 The legislative history indicates that the concept of loss em-
bodied in the subsection would allow recovery of expenses relating to
218. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 10.
219. See 1986 Act, supra note 25, § 2(d), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (1986) (prohibiting this type
of activity); see also infra notes 223-40 and accompanying text.
220. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 10.
221. 1986 Act, supra note 25, § 2(d), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (1988).
222. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 10 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (1988)).
223. See id. The "intentional" standard was intended to have the same meaning as the "in-
tentional" standard used in subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3).
224. 1986 Act, supra note 25, § 2(d), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (1988).
225. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 10.
226. 1986 Act, supra note 25, § 2(d), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (1988).
227. Id., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B).
228. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 10.
229. Id. at 11 (noting that the misdemeanor penalties provided in subsections (a)(2) and
(a)(3) often would apply in such cases).
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lost computer time,23 0 reprogramming or restoring data to its original
condition, 23 1 and certain network communications users' fees. 232 The
legislative history also indicates that the losses sustained by authorized
users of computer services who rely on data that has been altered can
be included in reaching the one thousand dollar threshold.233
The legislative history precludes liability for damage caused by au-
thorized repairs or the automatic termination devices employed by
some computer leasing services.234 Congress feared that any alteration
of data caused by authorized repairs might constitute a technical viola-
tion of the subsection.23 5 The Senate report, however, emphasized that
the Act intentionally omitted such activity by making "unauthorized
access" a prerequisite to liability.236 Similarly, computer leasing services
that employ automatic termination devices triggered by nonpayment of
users' fees would not be liable under the subsection for "prevent[ing]
authorized use" because users who failed to make timely payment of
their fees no longer would be "authorized users."2 7
The second subsection, (a)(5)(2), created criminal liability for the
alteration, damage, or destruction of medical records and required no
showing of pecuniary loss on the part of any person.38 Congress felt
that the act of tampering with computerized medical records was seri-
ous enough to warrant punishment without a showing of any loss. 23 9
The legislative history specifies that prosecutors would not be required
to show that a patient had been given an incorrect or harmful treat-
ment because of altered medical records because the potential for such
harm was sufficient to warrant criminal sanctions.240
Subsection (a)(6) created the last of the three new offenses in the
1986 Act. The subsection made it a crime to traffic in computer pass-
230. See id. The Senate report recognized the inherent value of computer time. The report
pointed out that an unauthorized user could impose substantial costs on a computer service pro-
vider solely by monopolizing one channel of access to the service. Id. Blocking a channel of access
would be one way of committing the subsection (a)(5) offense of preventing the authorized use of a
computer. Thus, subsection (a)(5) covers acts of trespass involving primarily the loss of computer
time that are excluded from subsection (a)(4).
231. Id.
232. See id. at 11-12. Victims also could recover losses caused by excessive communication
access fees generated by the auto-dialers that hackers use in conjunction with modems when they
attempt to break into computer systems that are hooked into telecommunications networks. Id.










words under certain circumstances. 41 Congress added the provision pri-
marily to deter hackers from trading computer passwords over "pirate
bulletin boards. '242 The subsection permitted prosecution of persons
who knowingly and with intent to defraud, trafficked in computer pass-
words or information 243 that would allow unauthorized access to federal
government computers.244 The provision also made it possible to prose-
cute persons engaged in such trafficking if it affected interstate or for-
eign commerce.245 The subsection defined "trafficking" as transferring
or otherwise disposing of passwords to others or obtaining control of
passwords with the intent of doing So.246
The 1986 Act also eliminated the specific conspiracy offense from
subsection (b) and made a number of changes to the punishment provi-
sions in subsection (c). 247 Congress dropped the specific conspiracy of-
fense created by the 1984 Act so that such conduct would be governed
by the general federal conspiracy provisions contained in title eigh-
teen.248 Similarly, Congress amended subsection (c) to provide for fines
as specified in title eighteen.2 4 The 1986 Act amended the penalty pro-
visions by adding subsection (a)(6) to the list of misdemeanor offenses
and creating a new felony provision to cover the offenses created by the
addition of subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5).250 The penalty provisions re-
tained the two-tier approach to punishing repeat offenders.25'
The 1986 Act, in response to the criticisms of the 1984 Act,252
241. 1986 Act, supra note 25, § (2)(d), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(6) (1988).
242. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 13.
243. Id. The legislative history indicates that the term "password" did not mean only a single
word that enables a person to access a computer. The term also was meant to include sets of
instructions for gaining access to a computer or system.
244. 1986 Act, supra note 25, § 2(d), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(6)(B) (1988).
245. Id., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(6)(A).
246. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 13. The definition was borrowed from 18 U.S.C. §
1029 (1988), which relates to credit card offenses. See 1986 Act, supra note 25, § 2(d), 18 U.S.C. §
1030(a)(6) (1988).
247. 1986 Act, supra note 25, § 2(e), (f), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(b), (c) (1988).
248. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 13 (noting that Congress considered the general
conspiracy offense in 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988) preferable to a separate, specific offense).
249. The drafters of the amendments favored the general fine provisions of the Criminal Fine
Enforcement Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3623 (1988), which provided fines of up to $100,000 for
misdemeanor convictions punishable by more than six months in prison and fines of up to
$250,000 for felony convictions. The Act also allowed judges to fine offenders up to twice the
amount of their gain or twice the amount of the loss they caused their victims, whichever amount
was greater.
250. 1986 Act, supra note 25, § 2(f), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c) (1988).
251. Id., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(c). Subsections (c)(3)(A) and (B) made first-time offenses under
subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5) punishable by fines and/or prison sentences of up to five years for
first-time offenders and imposed fines and/or prison sentences of up to ten years for repeat
offenders.
252. See supra Part If(B).
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added a new subsection which defined several terms used in the Act.
The new subsection (e) added definitions for the terms "federal interest
computer," "state," "financial institution," "financial record," "exceeds
authorized access, 25  and "department of the United States. 254 The
final change under the 1986 Act was the addition of subsection (f),
which specifically excluded the lawful "investigative, protective, or in-
telligence activity" of federal, state, and local law enforcement officials
from coverage under the Act.255
IV. ADDITIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A lack of accurate information concerning computer crime hin-
dered legislators who attempted to address the need for federal com-
puter crime legislation. 256 One data processing professional compared
the problem to trying to "nail[] Jell-O to the wall" because no one had
253. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 13. The report noted that the phrase "obtaining
information" as used in the definition for "exceeds authorized access" would include the mere
observation of information.
254. 1986 Act, supra note 25, § 2(g)(4), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (1988). Subsection (e)(2) defined
a "Federal interest computer:"
[A] computer-(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States Gov-
ernment, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or for a financial
institution or the United States Government and the conduct constituting the offense affects
the use of the financial institution's operation or the Government's operation of such com-
puter; or (B) which is one of two or more computers used in committing the offense, not all of
which are located in the same State.
Id., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2).
Subsection (e)(3) defines a "State" to include "the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, and any other possession or territory of the United States." Id., 18 U.S.C. §
1030(e)(3).
Subsection (e)(4) defines the term "financial institution:"
(A) a bank with deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; (B) the Fed-
eral Reserve or a member of the Federal Reserve including any Federal Reserve Bank; (C) an
institution with accounts insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation;
(D) a credit union with accounts insured by the National Credit Union Administration; (E) a
member of the Federal home loan bank system and any home loan bank; (F) any institution
of the Farm Credit System under the Farm Credit Act of 1971; (G) a broker-dealer registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to section 15 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934; and (H) the Securities Investor Protection Corporation.
Id., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(4).
Subsection (e)(5) defines the term "financial record" as "information derived from any record
held by a financial institution pertaining to a customer's relationship with the financial institu-
tion." Id., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(5).
Subsection (e)(6) defines the term "exceeds authorized access" as "to access a computer with
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the acces-
sor is not entitled so to obtain or alter." Id., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).
Subsection (e)(7) defines the term "department of the United States" as "the legislative or
judicial branch of the Government or one of the executive departments enumerated in section 101
of title 5." Id., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(7).
255. Id. § (2)(h), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(f).
256. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
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a firm idea of the parameters of the problem. 57 No one had established
an accepted definition of computer crime,25 8 and no accurate statistics
on the incidence of computer crime had been developed."" Computer
crime was analogous to the proverbial emperor's clothes: everybody pro-
claimed it was there, but no one could see it. The little extant data
established that some sort of problem existed,260 but no one had a clear
idea of its nature or extent.
Thus, the 1984 Act essentially was a shot in the dark. Congress
defined certain acts as criminal and set penalties for those acts. Legisla-
tors were aware that the 1984 Act provided only a working definition at
best,26 ' but felt that immediate action to address a perceived immediate
threat was necessary. 262
Critics stated that the 1984 Act was incomplete and ineffective,263
and prosecutors rarely used it. 264 Commentators thus suggested that
new legislation was needed to broaden the scope of federal protection in
order to facilitate prosecution of computer related crimes and to en-
courage victims to report computer crimes.65 They observed that the
lack of prosecutions limited the deterrent value of the 1984 Act.266 Con-
sequently, Congress attempted to define the goals of federal computer
crime legislation with greater specificity. The subsequent hearings re-
257. See Betts, supra note 107, at 11 (quoting Richard Cashion, Chairman of the Data
Processing Management Association's Committee on Computer Crime).
258. See Computer Fraud Hearing, supra note 22, at 43 (statement of William G. Petty on
behalf of the National District Attorney's Association). Mr. Petty noted that, at the time he spoke,
no uniform definition existed of what constituted criminal conduct in the area of computer related
crime. Id.
The lack of uniformity in state law definitions of computer crime has been attributed to the
fact that state computer crime laws tend to be reactive, targeting specific crimes. See Nawrocki,
supra note 2, at 14-15; see also Computer Fraud Hearing, supra note 22, at 49 (statement of
William G. Petty).
259. See Federal Computer Systems Protection Hearing, supra note 41, at 22 (statement of
Milton R. Wessel, General Counsel to the Association of Data Processing Service Organizations).
260. See id. at 18. Mr. Wessel served for 17 years as the general counsel to the Association of
Data Processing Service Organizations, an organization of 560 of the best known computer service
companies. He stated that his position allowed him to gauge accurately the level of computer crime
in the industry. He believed that computer crime was a significant problem, but felt that the com-
panies he dealt with did not consider the problem to be epidemic. Id.
261. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (discussing the role that interest groups
and the media played in catalyzing the legislative process).
263. See supra Part II(B).
264. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (discussing the statement of Mr. Petty
on behalf of the National District Attorney's Association). Compare, however, Mr. Petty's explana-
tion of the problem to that given by Mr. Bloombecker, Director of the National Center for Com-
puter Crime Data. See Bloombecker, supra note 15, at 53.
266. See Bloombecker, supra note 15, at 53.
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sulted in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.267
The modification of existing provisions and addition of new provi-
sions served two main goals. First, the 1986 Act reaffirmed Congress's
intent to limit federal computer crime law to those cases involving a
compelling federal interest.26 The new law embodied an expanded no-
tion of federal interest, but refrained from any wholesale usurpation of
state jurisdiction over computer related crime. Second, the law sought
to increase the deterrent effect of the existing provisions by closing
loopholes, modifying the elements of the existing offenses, and restruc-
turing and clarifying the language in the statute.26
Several policy considerations supported Congress's decision to
maintain significant limits on the scope of federal computer crime legis-
lation. The decision reflected the Judiciary Committee's long-standing
policy of limiting federal crimes to matters of compelling federal inter-
est or to criminal acts that state and local governments are incapable of
handling.270 Congress wanted to encourage state and local legislators
and law enforcement officials to handle computer related crime.271 The
policy also recognized the need to use scarce federal law enforcement
resources efficiently. 2
The continued desire to limit the scope of federal computer crime
legislation also acknowledged the states' own interests in prosecuting
computer crime. 7 3 The acts that constitute computer crimes are all
common-law crimes; the only difference is that the perpetrators of com-
puter crime use computers to accomplish their goals 4.27 All states had
general criminal statutes prohibiting these sorts of acts, but they took
the lead in enacting computer crime legislation when they realized that
their existing criminal statutes could not deal adequately with the de-
mands that computer facilitated crimes put on their general criminal
statutes.276 Florida enacted the first computer crime law in the nation
267. 1986 Act, supra note 25, § 2, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1988).
268. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 4.
269. See supra Part III(A).
270. See Computer Crime Hearing, supra note 33, at 28 (statement of Rep. Don Edwards,
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights).
271. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 4.
272. See Computer Crime Hearing, supra note 33, at 28; see also S. REP. No. 432, supra note
10, at 4.
273. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 4.
274. See Federal Computer Systems Protection Hearing, supra note 41, at 48.
275. See Comment, Computer Crime Deterrence, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 391 (1986). This Com-
ment explains how judges had interpreted general criminal statutes to exclude computer facilitated
crimes. States responded to the unfavorable judicial interpretations of their general criminal stat-
utes by enacting specific computer crime statutes designed to overcome the inadequacies of the
general criminal statutes. Id. at 391-92.
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in 1978,278 long before federal legislators began to address seriously the
need for computer crime legislation. 7 7 Forty-seven states had enacted
specific computer crime statutes by 1986.278 As a result, Congress would
have preempted a significant body of law by enacting broader legisla-
tion and chose instead to limit federal protection to areas of "compel-
ling Federal interest. 2 79
The lack of prosecutions under the 1984 Act hurt its deterrent
value. Witnesses at the committee hearings concerning amendments to
the 1984 Act attributed the lack of prosecution to the Act's narrow
scope and to the difficult burdens it reportedly placed on prosecutors. 80
This criticism focused the amendment process on providing additional
legal tools to enhance protection under the Act, but apparently led to
the exclusion of alternate means of increasing the deterrent value of the
law.
Congress approached the deterrence problem under the assumption
that the beneficiaries of expanded protection would make use of the
tools that had been made available to them.28 ' This assumption may
have severely hindered Congress's effort to increase the deterrence
value of the legislation because many computer crime victims had con-
cluded that in the short term, their self-interest was served best by not
reporting computer crimes.282 They considered reporting their losses
embarrassing.28 3 Victims also feared that they might incur damaging
publicity if they reported computer crime losses. 284 In addition, these
companies felt that prosecution of computer crime was not cost-effec-
tive because of the time required to assist prosecutors and investigators
276. See Federal Computer Systems Protection Hearing, supra note 41, at 42. Florida
adopted the Florida Computer Crimes Act, Chapter 815 of the Florida State Code, in August of
1978. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815 (West Supp. 1989).
277. Senator Abraham Ribicoff introduced the first federal computer crime bill, S. 240, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), but it died quietly in committee.
278. See Bloombecker, supra note 15, at 56-57.
279. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 4.
280. See supra Part II(B).
281, See Bloombecker, supra note 15, at 53. The National Center for Computer Crime Data
reported that they had only been able to locate 75 prosecutions pursuant to 38 states' computer
crime laws. Id. Many of these laws predated federal legislation. The results of the report suggest
that victims of computer crime are not reporting the crimes to law enforcement officials. The Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation reported that their estimates indicated that only one in twenty-thou-
sand computer criminals ever went to jail. id.
282. See id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 53; see also A. BEQUAI, TECHNOCRIMES (1987), reprinted in part in Bloombecker,
supra note 15, at 63. Mr. Bequai noted that banks, out of fear of losing customer confidence, often
referred discovered crimes only to their in-house security for investigation. He added that banks
easily could mask their losses because of the variety of definitions and procedures available to
record such losses. Id.
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and the low probability that the defendant would make full restitution,
even if it was available." 5
The legislative history of the 1986 Act, however, indicates that
Congress barely acknowledged the problem of underreporting.286 The
Senate report on the 1986 Act concluded that the most effective means
of deterring computer crime was through comprehensive computer se-
curity efforts.8 7 Nevertheless, the legislative material gives no indica-
tion that Congress seriously considered trying to prevent computer
crime by requiring businesses or other computer operators to adopt se-
curity measures or by requiring that computer crime victims report in-
cidents to the police.2 88
A number of facts made the consideration of these reporting op-
tions very important. Witnesses informed legislators that most com-
puter crime was committed by insiders, not teenage hackers working
from home computers. 289 As a result, Congress focused on the deter-
rence of white collar crime as one of the major goals of the 1984 Act.290
Legislators viewed the economic drain caused by white collar crime as a
major problem that they could address successfully.2"' They also be-
lieved that facilitating the prosecution of violators under federal com-
puter crime legislation could and would be an effective deterrent to
white collar criminals.292
Unfortunately, the 1984 Act failed to achieve this purpose. The
lack of prosecutions under the Act effectively destroyed its deterrent
value. The amendments under the 1986 Act did, without question, en-
hance the potential for deterrence. If, however, the deterrence problem
is attributed to the reluctance of victims to report computer crimes
rather than to the prosecutors' inability to convict reported violators,
then the 1986 Act may not have increased actual deterrence by any sig-
285. Bloombecker, supra note 15, at 53.
286. In contrast, earlier committee reports that predated the adoption of federal computer
crime legislation did acknowledge and discuss the utility of other methods of deterrence, such as
computer security efforts. See Federal Computer Systems Protection Hearing, supra note 41. See
generally Computer Security Hearings, supra note 33; Computer Crime Hearing, supra note 33.
287. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 10, at 3.
288. See Betts, Cracking Down on Computer Crime, COMPUTERWORLD, November 25, 1985,
at 56. Legislators did, as a part of the debate over the passage of The Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986, consider whether data communications should receive privacy protection if
parties took no steps to protect such information. Id.
289. See Compu.ter Crime Hearing, supra note 33, at 49; see also Computer Security Hear-
ings, supra note 33, at 41-42.
290. See H.R. REP. No. 894, supra note 66, at 5.
291. Id. The House Report on the 1984 Act cited statistics indicating that Justice Depart-
ment prosecutions of bid-fixing cases resulted in significantly lower building costs for federal
projects. Id.
292. Id.; see also Computer Security Hearings, supra note 33, at 41 (analogizing the need for




V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE AMENDMENTS
Congress should consider legislation requiring businesses and other
computer operators to adopt security measures and to report any com-
puter crimes committed against them. This type of legislation could en-
hance the deterrent effect of the 1986 Act significantly and would help
make computers less vulnerable to computer crime by requiring com-
puter users to develop better "guards" and "locks" for their systems.
The enhanced guard or auditing capabilities that would become
mandatory under such regulations also would enhance the computer op-
erator's ability to detect computer crime. Moreover, security regulations
would focus computer users' thoughts on the continuing need for effec-
tive computer security. Reporting requirements also would enhance de-
terrence by ensuring that known computer crimes are reported and
prosecuted. A reporting requirement would complement regulations re-
quiring reasonable and effective security measures and would help gen-
erate useful data on the incidence of computer crime and how to deter
such crime most effectively.
Federal banking law provides some mechanisms for requiring fi-
nancial institutions to implement such requirements. Section 1882 of
title twelve requires "federal supervisory agencies"2 94 to promulgate
rules establishing minimum standards that banks and savings and loan
associations must observe with respect to the installation, maintenance,
and operation of security devices and procedures in order to discourage
robberies, burglaries, and larcenies and to assist in the identification
and arrest of persons who commit such acts.295 Congress could, in fu-
ture amendments to federal computer crime law, stipulate that "federal
supervisory agencies" as defined in title twelve be required to study the
problem of computer crime in financial institutions and to promulgate
security regulations specifically relating to computer security based on
293. See Editorial, The Real Target, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 27, 1989, at 20 (supporting the
thesis that the 1986 Act is not being used to prosecute "insider," white collar criminals for the
same reasons that were listed earlier in the text of this section).
294. 12 U.S.C. § 1881 (1988) defines a "Federal supervisory agency:"
(1) The Comptroller of the Currency with respect to national banks and district banks, (2)
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System with respect to Federal Reserve banks
and State banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System, (3) The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation with respect to State banks which are not members of the Federal
Reserve System but the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration, and (4) The Federal Home Loan Bank Board with respect to Federal savings and
loan associations, and institutions the accounts of which are insured by the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation.
Id.




Section 1882 also specifies that "federal supervisory agencies" must
require banks and savings and loan associations to submit periodic re-
ports concerning the operation of their security devices.29 This provi-
sion apparently would allow federal supervisory agencies to require
applicable financial institutions to report any detected computer
crimes.297 The appropriate financial institutions must follow such secur-
ity regulations and reporting requirements or be subject to "cease and
desist proceedings" under the federal Safety and Soundness Act.9 8
Federal securities laws also could be adapted to achieve similar re-
sults in the corporate arena. The securities laws would not provide any
computer security standards, but the reporting requirements under fed-
eral securities law could spur corporate reports of computer crime. The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 9 9 provides an analogy of how
security law could be used to enhance corporate computer security
practices. The FCPA essentially prohibits "issuers" and "domestic con-
cerns" from bribing foreign officials. 00 The FCPA also includes an ac-
counting provision that requires issuers to make and keep books,
records, and accounts that reflect, in reasonable detail, the transactions
and disposition of assets of the issuer.30 1 One of the primary rationales
supporting the FCPA is the view that the shareholders have a right to
know about overseas activity which, although not illegal under United
States law, could result in a possible loss of business to the corpora-
tion. 2 A second rationale is that investors have a right to know about
management's stewardship of corporate assets. 303
The rationale for the adoption of a computer crime reporting provi-
sion under the Securities and Exchange Act would be different because
the failure to report a crime is a passive rather than an affirmative act
of wrongdoing. The failure to report crime only creates corporate waste
296. Id. § 1822(b).
297. Alternatively, Congress could enact specific legislation analogous to the federal money
laundering statute. See 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). That statute requires banks to
report cash deposits of more than $10,000. Id. The statute, therefore, requires banks to report
certain acts that would be considered evidence of money laundering activity. Similarly, Congress
could enact a statute requiring financial institutions to report evidence of computer crime uncov-
ered by internal security measures.
298. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1988).
299. Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 102-104, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1988)).
300. See id4 see also Timmeny, An Overview of the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM.
235, 239-41 (1982).
301. See Timmeny, supra note 300, at 240.
302. Id. Timmeny was a Deputy Director of the Security and Exchange Commission's Divi-




to the extent that it weakens the deterrence value of the law and aban-
dons the opportunity to gain restitution. Nevertheless, such passive ac-
tivity in the aggregate does result in significant loss of corporate assets
to white collar criminals.
A reporting requirement would allow shareholders and potential in-
vestors to assess the validity of the choice not to report losses. Market
forces and the threat of shareholder actions would force the directors of
corporations to give some consideration to a corporate computer crime
policy.30 4 This consideration would not solve the problem, but it might
enhance deterrence." 5 In addition, if corporations were required to dis-
close their computer crime losses in a meaningful fashion, the resulting
publicity might overcome any disincentive to prosecute under existing
law.30 6
The mechanisms of control provided by federal security and bank-
ing laws also provide a scope of authority that is well suited to Con-
gress's goal of limiting computer crime legislation to areas of compelling
federal interest. Those mechanisms also have been tested in practice.
Thus, Congress should and can consider the propriety of requiring, via
these mechanisms, businesses and other computer operators to adopt
security measures and to report any computer crimes committed
against them.
Congress also should consider adding civil remedies and restitution
provisions to the 1986 Act. Several states already have adopted such
provisions to provide victims with added incentive to report computer
crimes.307 One state even provides treble damages for harm resulting
from willful and malicious conduct.30 8 Congress also should consider ap-
propriating funds to train law enforcement officials and to educate the
public concerning computer crime.
The symbolic value of these provisions would be very important.30 9
The law serves to educate and socialize society regarding the proper
304. See Bloombecker, supra note 15, at 66. TRW, Inc. recently settled out of court as the
defendant in a case which alleged that the corporation had failed to take proper steps to protect
the privacy of computerized information under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Id. Citibank also
recently settled a civil action brought by the New York Attorney General's office which alleged
that the bank had provided inadequate security for its automated teller machines. Id. Thus, a
trend may be developing to hold corporations and banks responsible for their failure to protect
against computer related crime. A reporting requirement would increase this sort of pressure.
305. Such reporting requirements would be useful only if corporations were required to char-
acterize their computer crime losses clearly. Otherwise, the cause of the losses might be camou-
flaged. See id. at 63.
306. See supra notes 282-85 and accompanying text.
307. See Bloombecker, Computer Crime Victims Have Recourse to Novel Legal Remedies,
COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 25, 1985, at 57.
308. Connecticut provides for treble damages. Id.
309. See Hollinger & Lanza-Kaduce, supra note 32, at 114.
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ways to approach the use of new technology 10 Computer theft re-
mained a private dispute among employers and employees until com-
puter technology began to proliferate. 11 The public dissemination of
computer technology was the catalyst for federal computer crime legis-
lation,312 as personal computers and modems externalized the computer
crime phenomenon.31  Computer crime then became a threat to norma-
tive and institutional relationships, particularly in light of the develop-
ing "hacker ethic. 3 1 4 People in all levels of society began to use
computers without a clear understanding that computer data embodied
traditionally valued concepts such as privacy and property. 1 5 More-
over, from a forward looking perspective, children of white collar fami-
lies were learning to manipulate computers in an environment
providing little supervision and few established norms. 16
The 1986 Act helped to clarify the value of concepts of property
and privacy as they relate to computer technology. The law served to
educate potential abusers. The challenge now is to educate users and
operators on how to prevent computer crime and to convince them of
the desirability of reporting such crime. If Congress does not success-
fully meet this challenge then it is unlikely to solve the growing prob-
lem of computer crime.
Dodd S. Griffith
310. Id.
311. Id. at 115.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.; see also, Betts, Portrait of a Hacker, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 25, 1985, at 56.
315. See Hollinger & Lanza-Kaduce, supra note 32, at 116-18.
316. Id. at 118.
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